

# The MCP & AI Agent Trust Preflight

20 checks before you let an MCP connect or an agent act.

20 CHECKS

4 PARTS

MCP + AGENT

LOCAL-FIRST

## 10

MCP CHECKS

Surface, schema, secrets, drift

## 6


AGENT CHECKS

Reach, chains, blast radius

## 4

PROOF CHECKS

Freshness, evidence, mediation



## THE OPERATING PRINCIPLE

### Inspect. Baseline. Re-check.

Every check can be run by hand. ECZ-ID automates the repeatable work without turning configuration evidence into a false safety verdict.

# A manual preflight you can actually defend.

You would not deploy a service you had never inspected. Yet teams routinely wire MCP servers into editors or let agents act having reviewed little more than a name.

**HONEST SCOPE MATTERS**

These checks describe configuration, declared capability, drift, authority and evidence. They do not turn an MCP server or agent into a guaranteed-safe system.

|    |                                                                           |       |
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| 02 | <b>Change &amp; drift</b><br>Baselines, fingerprints, silent redefinition | 7-10  |
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| 04 | <b>Proof &amp; mediation</b><br>Evidence, freshness, observed vs enforced | 17-20 |

**GOOD ANSWER**      Specific enough that another engineer can reproduce the check and reach the same conclusion.

**BAD ANSWER**      A reassuring label, screenshot or assumption with no baseline, no scope and no evidence trail.

# The MCP surface

Before trust, inventory. You cannot reason about what you have not enumerated.

## 1 Enumerate every MCP server

Find workspace and user MCP configuration, legacy client files and server declarations. Record source and location.

## 2 Identify transport and executable

Distinguish STDIO from HTTP. Record the command basename or remote origin without leaking credentials.

## 3 Read tool descriptions like code

Tool descriptions influence model behaviour. Review names, descriptions and declared capabilities rather than trusting labels.

## 4 Inspect schemas, not just names

Look for powerful inputs, overly broad shapes and parameter changes that expand what a tool can do.

## 5 Name dangerous capabilities

Call out shell, filesystem, network, package, deployment, database or destructive capabilities explicitly.

## 6 Audit credential-shaped env names

Inventory environment variable names without exposing values. Unexpected token/key names are a review signal.

# Change and drift

The server you reviewed in March is not necessarily the server you are running today.

## 7 Record a baseline you can compare

Capture privacy-filtered structure: transport, command shape, environment key names, tool/schema digests and origins.

## 8 Use fingerprints that survive secret rotation

A useful fingerprint changes when posture changes, not when an API key rotates.

## 9 Treat tool redefinition as high-signal

A description, schema or capability change can materially alter behaviour without changing the server name.

## 10 Re-check before reliance

Freshness matters. Re-run after config changes, package updates, new tools, new origins or before high-reliance use.

# Agent authority

An agent risk is not what it is called. It is everything it can reach.

## 11 Inventory agent surfaces by content

Find manifests, tool specs, framework configs, webhook definitions and MCP relationships - not filenames alone.

## 12 Map real reachable capability

Follow declared tools, MCP targets, API origins and permissions to understand the actual authority graph.

## 13 Separate read, write and destructive power

Do not collapse file-read, external send, package mutation and deployment into one vague permission bucket.

## 14 Look for dangerous action chains

Credential access plus external send; filesystem plus network; package mutation plus deployment - chains matter.

## 15 Find credential exposure paths

Track credential-shaped key names to the capabilities that can read, transform or transmit data.

## 16 Make Agent-to-MCP dependence explicit

An agent can inherit the risk and authority of every MCP server it can invoke. Review both sides together.

# Proof and mediation

The difference between believing and knowing is whether the claim can be re-checked.

## 17 Separate observed from enforced

Config inspection is OBSERVED. Runtime ENFORCED should only appear while a live mediation path actually exists.

## 18 Minimise secrets before runtime

When mediation is used, launch servers with only the environment keys they actually need. Do not display secret values.

## 19 Use deterministic local policy

For high-risk tools, explicit ALLOW / WARN / REVIEW / BLOCK / QUARANTINE rules are easier to audit than hidden judgement.

## 20 Demand evidence and re-check

Keep evidence you can hand to another reviewer. Re-check freshness, authority and current state before reliance.

# Run the repeatable work automatically.

Twenty checks are useful as a manual discipline. ECZ-ID MCP Trust and Agent Trust turn the repeatable parts into local, reviewable workflow.

### ECZ-ID MCP Trust

CONFIG, CHANGE, RUNTIME

- MCP X-Ray inventory
- Change alerts and baselines
- Credential-shaped-name warnings
- Pro: Local Trust Gate
- Pro: Secret Shield + epochs

COMMUNITY: FREE - NO ACCOUNT REQUIRED

### ECZ-ID Agent Trust

AUTHORITY, REACH, CHAINS

- Agent X-Ray inventory
- Authority Graph + reachability
- Dangerous action-chain indicators
- Authority Epochs
- Reciprocal MCP view

COMMUNITY: FREE - NO ACCOUNT REQUIRED

Community gives useful evidence. Pro adds depth and control.

| CAPABILITY                                 | COMMUNITY | PRO |
|--------------------------------------------|-----------|-----|
| Inventory + declared capability            | Yes       | Yes |
| Single baseline + change detection         | Yes       | Yes |
| Full epoch history + exact diffs           | -         | Yes |
| Authority Graph + action chains            | -         | Yes |
| Secret Shield preview                      | -         | Yes |
| Optional Local Trust Gate + MediationProof | -         | Yes |
| Exportable evidence / deeper remediation   | -         | Yes |

**BOUNDARY**

Community does not mediate runtime execution. Pro may optionally run a Local Trust Gate; ENFORCED appears only while the mediation evidence exists.

# Start free. Add depth only where you need it.

The fastest way to improve an MCP or agent workspace is to make the invisible surface visible first - then baseline it, diff it and mediate only where the risk justifies it.

## MCP TRUST PRO

**£12.99**

per month

£119 / year

## AGENT TRUST PRO

**£12.99**

per month

£119 / year

## DEVELOPER TRUST

**£19.99**

per month

£199 / year

1

INSTALL FREE

2

SCAN / REVIEW

3

BASELINE

4

GET PRO

5

ACTIVATE

6

RE-CHECK

## GET STARTED

### MCP Trust

<https://developers.ecocitizenz.com/mcp-trust>

### Agent Trust

<https://developers.ecocitizenz.com/agent-trust>

### Developer Trust bundle

<https://developers.ecocitizenz.com/developer-trust>

### Already purchased? Activate

<https://trustops.ecocitizenz.com/developer-trust/activate>

Early launch note: Pro access is designed to be available after payment confirmation. If an automated step is delayed, support can securely complete provisioning.



OPEN DEVELOPER TRUST



# The 10-minute team handoff.

Use this page before a new MCP server, agent integration or material configuration change. Save the evidence with the change ticket or review record.

**Inventory complete**

Every server, agent surface and relevant config is named.

---

**Execution path understood**

Transport, command or remote origin is known.

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**Dangerous capabilities explicit**

Shell, filesystem, network, write/destructive and deployment rights are visible.

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**Credential names reviewed**

Credential-shaped environment key names are visible without exposing values.

---

**Baseline captured**

Current structure is fingerprinted and ready for comparison.

---

**Drift reviewed**

Tool, schema, origin and authority changes are understood.

---

**Authority graph reviewed**

Agent-to-tool-to-MCP reach is understood.

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**High-risk chains reviewed**

Credential + external action, filesystem + network, package + deployment chains are visible.

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**Evidence state labelled honestly**

Observed is not called enforced. Enforced needs current mediation proof.

---

**Re-check date/trigger set**

Know when this evidence must be refreshed.

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# Make invisible authority visible.

Install the free extensions. Run the preflight. Baseline what you have. Add Pro where you need deeper history, authority analysis or runtime mediation.

INSTALL FREE

## MCP Trust

Microsoft Marketplace

OPEN ->

INSTALL FREE

## Agent Trust

Microsoft Marketplace

OPEN ->

GET PRO

## Developer Trust

MCP + Agent Pro

OPEN ->



## Resolve before reliance.

ECZ-ID Developer Trust helps you inspect configuration, preserve local evidence, understand authority and re-check current proof. Local policy decides what is sufficient.

[developers.ecocitizenz.com/developer-trust](https://developers.ecocitizenz.com/developer-trust)

No source, prompt or secret upload for Community checks. MCP Pro mediation is local and user-started. ECZ-ID does not turn configuration evidence into a certification, approval or safety guarantee.